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Introduction 
 Film and television portrayals of posthuman cyborgs melding biology and technology, 
simultaneously “animal and machine” (Haraway 1991, p.149), abound. Most of us immediately think of 
iconic characters like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s relentless cyborg assassin in the Terminator series or 
Peter Weller’s crime-fighting cyborg police officer in Robocop (1987). Or perhaps we recall the many 
cyborgs populating the Dr. Who, Star Trek, and Star Wars television series and films—including Darth 
Vader, surely the most famous cinematic cyborg of all time. But lesser-known explorations of cybernetic 
embodiment have appeared in film and television for many decades. And not all portrayals involve the 
sort of extreme transformations exemplified by these iconic characters. This chapter considers some of 
different ways that film and television have explored the transformative relation between embodiment 
and technology.  
 
Historical Background 
There is rich and varied cinematic history exploring the bounds of technologically-enhanced 
embodiment. Perhaps the first on-screen cyborg can be found in The Colossus of New York (1958), 
where the brain of an acclaimed scientist—severely injured in a car accident after winning a Nobel Peace 
Prize—is transplanted into a robotic body by his neurosurgeon father. Predictably, this project does not 
end well. But more cyborgs soon made on-screen appearances. Dr. No, the evil mastermind in the first 
James Bond movie—the 1962 film starring Sean Connery bears his name—is a cyborg sporting robotic 
arms, implanted after Chinese mobsters cut off his hands, that give him superhuman strength. Cyborg 
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2087 (1966) emerged a few years later. It tells the story of a cyborg sent back in time from the year 2087 
to 1966 by a group of “free thinkers”. His mission: prevent the development of technology that will 
eventually enable mass mind control. More recently, The Machine (2013), a slick, low-budget indie sci-fi 
thriller, explores different varieties of cybernetic augmentation: from severely wounded soldiers being 
resuscitated as powerful fighting machines via neural implants and specialized prosthetic limbs, to the 
remnants of a murdered artificial intelligence researcher’s neural information being transferred into a 
self-aware, morally conflicted robot killer bearing her physical likeness.   
Despite an understandable tendency to associate cinematic cyborgs with menacing characters 
like the Terminator or Darth Vader—these are the characters that seem to endure in our imagination, 
due both to the extent of their technologically-enhanced transformations (who can forget Vader’s 
ominous cybernetic armor and mechanical breathing?) as well as the high-definition havoc they wreak—
there are nevertheless friendlier examples of film and television cyborgs, too. For example, the 
television show The Six Million Dollar Man (1974-1978) chronicles the adventures of Steve Austen, an 
American astronaut who suffers a devastating accident while testing an experimental aircraft. He barely 
survives; his right arm, legs, and left eye are replaced with advanced “bionic” implants that give him 
superhuman strength, speed, and vision. The newly-constructed “bionic man” eventually goes to work 
as an agent for a top-secret US government office, heroically battling evils all and sundry. Cyborgs have 
also caught the imagination of young viewers. Although the film is largely forgettable, Inspector Gadget 
(1999)—based upon the popular television cartoon series of the same name—is essentially a Robocop 
for children. It tells the tale of John Brown, an earnest but bumbling security guard who, after being 
severely injured while attempting to thwart a robbery, wakes up to find that his damaged body has been 
retrofitted with a host of different on-demand technologies and gadgets enabling him to become a 
more effective (if still somewhat bumbling) crime fighter.  
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Two things stand out from this brief survey. First, most on-screen portrayals of technologically-
augmented embodiment stem from dramatic medical interventions, primarily the need to physically 
recover from some kind of catastrophic accident resulting in the loss of limbs, other body parts, or one’s 
entire non-neural body (e.g., The Colossus of New York). Even Darth Vader’s ominous black armor has a 
critical biomedical function. It consists of both prosthetic limbs as well as a portable life-support system 
enabling Vader to function after sustaining near-fatal injuries while battling Obi-Wan Kenobi. Rarely are 
non-medical cases portrayed; presumably non-critical cases of cybernetic enhancement lack the 
requisite dramatic impact. Second, most representations of cyborgs in films are characterized by the 
extent to which the subject’s cybernetic augmentation renders them profoundly other. Due to the 
extreme nature of their technological transfiguration, figures like the Terminator, Darth Vader, Robocop, 
or even the Six Million Dollar Man have largely escaped the limitations of the flesh. They can access a 
nearly limitless flow of information—think of the Terminator’s enhanced perceptual systems and 
continually-updated Heads-up Display (HUD) feeding him rich contextual data—and realize mental and 
physical capacities unavailable to the rest of us. Most of these iconic film and television cyborgs in this 
way play into what N. Katherine Hayle calls the technophilic dream of “fantasies of unlimited power and 
disembodied immortality” that ultimately pull the posthuman cyborg out of its organic connection with 
the social world and into a rarified life of cybernetic transcendence (Hayles 2002, p.6). Of course, these 
are fictional characters designed to maximize visual and narrative impact. Nevertheless, focusing just on 
these extreme cases does potentially obscure a more nuanced understanding of the way that cyborg 
realities can facilitate a deeper connection not just with the subject’s lived embodiment but also with 
the social world in which they are embedded.           
In what follows, I want to take a more phenomenologically oriented and “situated” approach to 
embodiment in film and television. Part of the force of the posthuman vision comes from the 
recognition that technological augmentations of mind, body, and self are not simply exotic possibilities 
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in the distant future. Rather, these augmentations are already a central part of our everyday lives; they 
are perpetually in-progress, happening all the time and in ways both small and significant. We are, after 
all, “natural born cyborgs” (Clark 2003). So instead of focusing on extreme examples exemplified by the 
Cyborg Holy Trinity of the Terminator, Robocop, and Darth Vader, I want to instead look at more 
mundane representations of biotech augmentation that arise from a subject’s desire to connect more 
deeply with self and other, that is, a desire to become more deeply enmeshed within the mundane 
dynamics of our social embodiment. In order to set up this perspective, however, I first consider 
discussions of “plastic” embodiment and cognitive extension in recent philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science.  
 
From plastic embodiment to cognitive extension 
The plastic body 
“Embodiment” is a central theme in current philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This is 
especially apparent in a family of views that fall under the label “embodied approaches to cognition” 
(e.g., Gallagher 2005; Gibbs 2005, Shapiro 2014). Embodied approaches to cognition argue that 
distinctively human forms of thought, perception, and affect are profoundly shaped by both the sorts of 
bodies we have (their physiology, morphology, etc.) as well as the things they can do (their capacity for 
movement, action, ability to use and incorporate various tools, etc.). Although embodied cognition 
theorists endorse a variety of ontological commitments and methodologies, proponents are 
nevertheless united in their rejection of the mind as something localized wholly in the head. They argue 
that mind is something that emerges within, and is even at times constituted by, ongoing patterns of 
world-engaged, world-involving action.   
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Various lines of empirical evidence are routinely summoned to motivate the embodied 
cognition thesis: for example, studies indicating an apparent  link between gesture, thought, and 
language processing (Goldin-Meadow 2003; McNeill 2005); enactive approaches to perception which 
argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by the ongoing exercise of sensorimotor skills (Noë 
2004; O’Regan 2011); work suggesting that feeling, perceiving, thinking and speaking about emotions 
depends upon feedback from somatovisceral and motoric processes (Laird 2007; Niedenthal 2007); and 
research on so-called “mirror neurons”, visuomotor neurons that fire both when an agent performs an 
action and observes someone else doing it (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). These lines of evidence seem 
to support to the idea that the body-beyond-the-brain makes a nontrivial contribution to both the form 
and content of our mental life.        
 But our bodies are not fixed entities. Rather, embodiment is, in a concrete sense, malleable, 
open—plastic (Krueger and Legrand 2009). Bodies are open to various forms of augmentation which in 
turn generate both structural and functional reconfiguration. One of the ways to bring out this plastic 
character of embodiment is to look at the various ways that we routinely incorporate and merge with 
the tools and technologies populating our everyday environments. These body-world couplings are 
instructive. They indicate how biotech augmentations not only change the physical structure and 
functional capacities of our bodies. They also reconfigure the phenomenology of our embodiment, that 
is, the way we experience our bodies as well as the way the world is disclosed to us via this bodily 
experience.    
Consider the way that simply picking up a stick and using it to probe our environment alters our 
felt sense of embodiment. After a few moments of habituation, the stick is no longer felt to be an object 
that we hold, something distinct from us and our agency. Rather, as Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) 
famously observed, the stick disappears, experientially speaking; it becomes the transparent vehicle 
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through which we perceptually access the world. Within this process, we experience a reconfiguration of 
our local sense of embodiment. When we skillfully deploy the stick to explore our world, we experience 
our body, as well as its attendant sensorimotor capacities, as extending into and through the stick 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1999). Moreover, we experience an expanded set of action-possibilities that flow 
from this newly-expanded sense of embodiment (Hirose 2002). The environment is experienced as 
affording interactions that weren’t there a moment ago: we can reach, poke, probe, and manipulate 
previously closed-off aspects of our world.  
An especially striking example of functional and phenomenological reconfiguration is evident in 
Paul Bach-Y-Rita’s work on sensory substitution, and his technology known as Tactile Visual Sensory 
Substitution System (TVSS), initially designed to bring vision to blind subjects (Bach-Y-Rita et al 2003). 
TVSS is a prosthetic visual technology that relies on the body’s ability to map information from one 
modality to another. It operates by transducing visual information from the environment, which enters 
through a head-mounted camera, into patterns of vibrations conveyed via stimulators in contact with 
the skin of the wearer’s abdomen, back, thigh, or tongue. As blind subjects adjust to the experience of 
wearing TVSS and begin to move around their environment, they report having quasi-visual experiences 
of three-dimensional objects—a kind of technologically-augmented tactile vision. Moreover, the 
technology very quickly becomes transparent, experientially speaking. The wearer no longer experiences 
the technology as an object but rather as something that has been integrated into their body and which 
helps to disclose the world in a perceptually novel way.   
TVSS may seem like the stuff of Terminator-style science fiction. But many similar everyday 
examples abound: we wear glasses to improve vision, hearing aids to enhance auditory perception, 
braces to stabilize unsteady joint and enhance balance, and electric wheelchairs to provide mobility. 
Skilled athletes and musicians routinely merge with their baseball bats and bagpipes, golf clubs and 
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guitars, and in so doing experience an expanded sense of embodiment and sensorimotor possibilities. 
The point, then, is that at the level of our plastic embodiment, everyday technologies integrate with our 
body and in so doing affect both functional and phenomenological change. This is because we are 
profoundly embodied agents, “creatures for whom body, sensing, world, and technology are resources 
apt for recruitment in ways that yield a permeable and repeatedly reconfigurable agent/world 
boundary” (Clark 2007, p.279).   
The embodied mind, extended 
Taking the nature of our plastic embodiment seriously opens the door to a more radical thesis, 
one very much in in line with posthuman discussions of technologically-augmented personhood 
(Malafouris 2008; Thweatt-Bates 2011). This is the extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998; 
Menary 2010). The extended mind thesis claims that the physical machinery of mind is not confined to 
the head. Rather, mental states such as beliefs and memories can be partially realized by artefacts and 
technologies beyond the boundaries of skin and skull.  
In Clark and Chalmer’s (1998) classic thought experiment, Otto—who suffers from memory loss 
brought on by a mild form of Alzheimer’s—carries a trusty notebook with him wherever he goes. Any 
time Otto picks up some new information, he records it in his notebook. When he needs that 
information (e.g., when he wants to remember the location of MoMA in New York so he can go see an 
exhibition), Otto simply consults this ever-present notebook, retrieves the information, and acts on it. 
According to Clark and Chalmers, this is a case of extended cognition. Some of Otto’s dispositional 
beliefs—such as his belief that MoMA is on 53rd street—are housed in his notebook. This is because the 
information in the notebook is functionally poised to play the same role that brain-bound information 
plays in non-extended cases, i.e., cases where an individual appeals purely to their internal bio-
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resources to accomplish different cognitive tasks. Otto’s long-term beliefs are thus not all inside his 
head.      
We need not appeal to thought experiments or science fiction narratives to further motivate 
this idea. Consider real-world memory augmentation. Smartphones and portable calendars help us 
recall appointments and phone numbers; affixing a yellow sticky note to the side of a computer monitor 
or by the door prompts recall of to-do items; even social and cultural practices and institutions (political 
structures, religious rituals, legal systems, etc.) play a cognitive role by encoding the complex web of 
historical narratives, memories, beliefs, and procedural knowledge collectively learned over many 
generations (Gallagher 2013). When we engage with these external structures and processes, we 
bootstrap our biological capacities—and within this ongoing engagement “the human organism is linked 
with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a 
cognitive system in its own right” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p.8).  
 In its original formulation, the extended mind thesis was thought to apply to non-conscious 
cognitive states (e.g., dispositional beliefs) but not necessarily to conscious mental states, such as 
emotions (Clark 2009; cf. Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003). Little was said about the phenomenology of self-
world couplings extending mind into the environment. But recent developments have lifted this 
constraint. Extended mind-style approaches have now been applied to various domains such as 
perceptual consciousness (Auvray and Myin 2009; Ward 2012), aesthetics (Krueger 2014; Cochrane 
2008), social cognition (Gallagher and Crisafi 2009; Theiner et al 2010), and emotion research (Kruger 
2014; Slaby 2014; Colombetti and Roberts 2015). Taking seriously the experience of augmenting and 
extending our embodied and cognitive capacities in various ways is an important feature of these new 
directions.  
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This is where a return to phenomenologically-sensitive portrayals of situated embodiment in 
film and television becomes pertinent. I now consider two films that might initially appear to have little 
to do with one another: Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000) and Mick Jackson’s made-for-TV movie, 
Temple Grandin (2010). Despite their very different subject matter, both films explore interrelated 
dimensions of embodiment, technologically-mediated cognitive extension, and interpersonal relations. 
 
“Really comfortable in my own skin”: embodiment in Memento and Temple Grandin  
Christopher Nolan’s psychological thriller Memento (2000) follows Leonard Schelby as he 
frantically hunts for his wife’s killer. This task is complicated by the fact that Leonard suffers from a 
severe form of anterograde amnesia; after suffering a blow to the head, he has lost the ability to form 
new memories, and many of his previous memories are now hazy and incomplete. The last thing 
Leonard remembers is intervening in his wife’s assault. He vaguely recalls shooting and killing one of the 
people responsible for the crime before being hit on the head by another assailant, moments after 
watching his wife die. Understandably, Leonard is now driven by an obsessive desire to find his wife’s 
killer and exact his revenge. 
But we soon learn that things are not this straightforward. First, Leonard’s motives may not be 
as noble as they initially appear. He willingly clings to a fabricated memory of a blissful marriage that, in 
reality, was deeply conflicted and probably violent. As his investigation unfolds, Leonard destroys all 
evidence compromising this fabricated reconstruction; he actively manipulates his memory in order to 
forget undesirable facts. Additionally, we soon come to see that Leonard’s associates—a corrupt former 
cop and a barmaid with a checkered past—are exploiting Leonard for their own agendas. Leonard’s 
rage-fuelled drive for revenge (including his eagerness to kill, if necessary) and his profoundly 
compromised memory render him supremely vulnerable to their ongoing manipulation. As he copes 
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with his unreliable memory and struggles to cling to fleeting moments of clarity, the viewer realizes that 
Leonard is caught up in a complex network of half-truths and lies—many of them of his own making.  
The dizzying dramatic impact of Memento comes from its narrative style which brazenly flouts 
the conventions of linear storytelling. As the story unfolds, we are taken directly into Leonard’s 
fractured experience: color sequences are interspersed with black and white sequences; the beginning 
and ending of events are spliced atop one another, confounding the meaning and context of different 
key occurrences and potentially opening up new lines of interpretation and significance. The effect of 
this fractured narrative is that the viewer gets a firsthand taste of the phenomenology of Leonard’s 
experience of a perpetually unstable world; we empathize, experientially, with his inability to find a firm 
narrative foothold in order to make sense of what is happening before each present moment withdraws 
into the darkness of his amnesia.  
So how does he cope? Even in his compromised state, Leonard still has access to many of the 
same cognitive resources that all natural born cyborgs do: his body and the surrounding environment. 
Leonard exploits these resources in a desperate attempt to stabilize his memory and retain new 
information. He collects scraps of paper, receipts, notes, and diary pages. He annotates Polaroid photos 
of important places and objects. Crucially, Leonard systematically organizes this information and places 
these artefacts in particular locations as memory prompts; since Leonard wakes up each morning with 
no memory of the previous day, this ritual of setting up the environment to reliably trigger a cascade of 
memories becomes a critical exercise. Leonard has, in effect, transformed a difficult cognitive problem 
(i.e., remembering complex information) into a much simpler perceptual problem by skillfully 
engineering his cognitive environment.     
But Leonard quite literally has another trick up his sleeve. The most important information 
Leonard acquires is tattooed onto his body. Over time, Leonard’s skin is gradually transformed into a 
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cognitive prosthesis, an external memory device that exhibits a stability and reliability Leonard’s 
neurobiological memory lacks.  Leonard’s body thus remembers the things his brain cannot. Collectively, 
then, Leonard attempts to use these memory-augmenting technologies—again, including the surface of 
his own body, now deliberately reconfigured into a cognitive prosthetic—to slowly build up a stock of 
new beliefs about the mystery of his wife’s death and in so doing establish a bedrock of long-term 
knowledge that will, he hopes, lead him to his wife’s killer.  
One of the many compelling embodiment-related themes in Memento is its exploration of what 
Leonard both gains and loses by relying on his body and environment so deeply. For, although these 
embodied strategies and resources enhance Leonard’s recall ability, they also render him extremely 
vulnerable. One of the consequences of Leonard’s functional reconfiguration of his embodiment (i.e., 
turning his body primarily into a memory storage device) is that Leonard’s experience of embodiment is 
profoundly altered. Leonard no longer simply inhabits his body as a subject; it ceases to be the 
transparent medium through which Leonard encounters the world. In virtue of his deep cognitive 
reliance on his body’s ever-increasing number of tattoos, his body is transfigured primarily into an 
object, another technology used to store and access crucial case-specific information. This is reflected in 
the way that Leonard spends a great deal of time simply looking at his body, standing in front of a mirror 
while studying his tattoos and trying to piece together the clues they hold. Leonard’s relation with his 
embodiment in this way becomes as fractured and vulnerable as is his relation with the environment. He 
no longer inhabits his body transparently. Rather, as essential parts of his externalized memory, both 
Leonard’s carefully curated collection of notes and photographs as well as the tattoos on his body 
occupy a contested public space vulnerable to manipulation and sabotage by others (Sterelny 2004). His 
memories are no longer his alone; they inhabit a public domain and are therefore open to the deception 
and hidden agendas of other people. Indeed, we soon see that many of these externalized memories are 
sabotaged by others, including Leonard’s manipulative associates as well as “other” Leonards from 
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previous days and weeks the present-day Leonard can no longer recall. Leonard’s functionally 
augmented embodiment is thus a source of both intimacy and alienation, security and vulnerability. 
Mick Jackson’s television movie Temple Grandin (2010) offers an alternative perspective on 
intimacy, alienation, and augmented embodiment. It portrays the way that technologies—including 
technologies repurposed in surprising ways—can extend and reconfigure basic structures of 
embodiment and, in so doing, enhance affectivity and interpersonal intimacy. The movie tells the story 
of Temple Grandin, a professor of Animal Sciences at Colorado State University, world-leading expert on 
livestock handling, and author of several books recounting her first-person experience of autism. People 
with autism like Temple have difficulty coping with the social world. They exhibit a range of different 
communicative and emotional impairments: difficulty maintaining eye contact and participating in the 
to-and-fro of interactions, extreme discomfort at being held or touched by others, narrowly 
circumscribed interests and ritualistic or compulsive behavior, and heightened sensitivity to sounds, 
textures, smells, light, etc. Temple describes her own childhood as a period where she displayed many 
of these symptoms: “no speech, poor eye contact, tantrums, appearance of deafness, no interest in 
people, and constant staring off into space” (Grandin 2006, p.33). As a child, Temple was taken to a 
neurologist and declared “brain-damaged”. Eventually, however, with the support of her mother and 
the patient mentorship of a high school science teacher, Temple discovered her immense intellectual 
gifts. But she still struggled to emotionally connect with others.     
 A crucial step in Temple’s entry into the social world was her development of a kind of 
emotional technology she calls the “squeeze machine” (Grandin 2006, pp. 56-83). Temple modeled her 
squeeze machine on farm technology: “crushes” used to immobilize livestock while being branded or 
given veterinary treatment. Livestock crushes consist of a small stall, just long enough for the animal to 
enter, an entrance gate which can be closed behind the animal, and a “head bail” at the front of the stall 
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to hold the animal’s head in place. A “squeeze crush” like Temple’s has an additional feature: its sides 
can be manually compressed, slowly moving inward until they gently squeeze the animal along the 
length of its body. This tactile pressure calms the animal and reduces their anxiety by inhibiting 
perceptual stimulation and movement.   
Temple discovered that she, too, could exploit this technology to regulate her own anxiety and 
unpredictable emotions. One day when Temple was fourteen and staying on her aunt’s cattle ranch in 
Arizona, she instinctively ran into a cattle crush while gripped by a panic attack (she previously bonded 
with the cattle and would spend a great deal of time with them in their pen). As Jackson portrays this 
event in his film, Temple’s distraught aunt follows Temple as she sprints from the house and lodges 
herself inside the crush. Understandably, Temple’s aunt begs her to get out. But Temple is insistent: she 
frantically pleads with her aunt to manually compress it. Reluctantly, her aunt does so—and as Temple 
feels the sides of the crush gradually surround her body, her anxiety dissipates. As she later describes 
this transformative experience, “For about an hour afterward I felt very calm and serene. My constant 
anxiety had diminished. This was the first time I ever felt really comfortable in my own skin” (Grandin 
2006, p.59, my emphasis).        
What Temple discovered is that her squeeze machine functions as an external technology 
replicating human touch—but without the unpredictable elements of face-to-face interaction she finds 
distressing. She tells us that, “From as far back as I can remember, I always hated to be hugged. I wanted 
to experience the good feeling of being hugged, but it was too overwhelming. It was like a great, all-
engulfing tidal wave of stimulation, and I reacted like a wild animal” (Grandin 2006, p.56). When bodily 
integrated with the squeeze machine, however, Temple can comfortably regulate the sensory 
parameters of the encounter.  
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Emboldened by this discovery, Temple used her engineering genius to build many iterations of 
her squeeze machine—from a crude, hastily-assembled model comprised of plywood panels and string-
controlled pulleys, to a more sophisticated version sporting foam-padded panels and an air-valve lever 
enabling fine-grained manipulations of pressure. As the sophistication of her technology increased, 
Temple was able to achieve more significant results. Regular sessions in the squeeze machine 
throughout the day enabled Temple to better regulate her emotions and reduce her anxiety. They also 
enhanced Temple’s experience of embodiment. As her technology became more sophisticated, it 
afforded deeper forms of integration which, in turn, allowed Temple to explore previously-inaccessible 
dimensions of her bodily phenomenology. She writes, “In developing many varied, complex ways to 
operate the squeeze machine on myself, I keep discovering that slight changes in the way I manipulate 
the control lever affect how it feels...very small variations in the rate and timing…[are] like a language of 
pressure, and I keep finding new variations with slightly different sensations. For me, this is the tactile 
equivalent of a complex emotion and this has helped me to understand the complexity of feelings” 
(Grandin 2006, p.92). Not only did her squeeze machine scaffold the development of greater intimacy 
with her own embodiment, then. It also enabled Temple use this deepened phenomenological 
sensitivity to better connect with others on an emotional level. As she puts it, she came to understand 
that “the pleasurable feelings [elicited by the squeeze machine] were those associated with love for 
other people…I would have been as hard as unfeeling as a rock if I had not built my squeeze machine and 
followed through with its use” (Grandin 2006, p.85, emphasis mine). Whereas Leonard’s augmented 
embodiment in Memento led to a greater sense of bodily self-alienation, Temple’s cybernetic practices 
appear to have had the opposite effect. 
 In sum, this brief discussion indicates some of the ways that transformative relations between 
embodiment and technology have been explored in film and television. Apart from their aesthetic value, 
these on-screen portrayals of posthuman embodiment remind us that to be an embodied subject is to 
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be always in some way transcending that embodiment. As natural born cyborgs, we are most at home 
when living in and beyond our skin.     
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